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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
LEGALITY OF THE MARYLAND PUBLIC
UTILITIES DISPUTES ACT
By BERNARD J. SEFF*
In order effectively to attempt an evaluation of the
legality of the Maryland Public Utilities Disputes Act,
(hereinafter referred to as the Seizure Bill), which was
enacted on March 2, 1956,1 it would be helpful to establish
the perspective of an appropriate frame of reference. It
would seem that this can best be accomplished by setting
forth a brief statement of the factual background of the
labor dispute which led to the passage of the Seizure Bill.
A succinct statement of this information appears in the
Labor Law Journal of October 1956 which is generously
quoted from below:2
"Maryland... became the ninth state of the union
to enact legislation providing for compulsory settle-
ment machinery for disputes in public utilities. The
Maryland Public Utilities Disputes Act, which provides
for voluntary arbitration, seizure, compulsory media-
tion and compulsory arbitration, was passed specifically
to stop a 37-day-old strike involving 2,000 employees
of the Baltimore Transit Company, members of Divi-
sion 1300, Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric
Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, AFL-
CIO.
"Its enactment came as a desperation move by the
state, and only after exhaustion of almost every mech-
anism for voluntary settlement employed by the City
of Baltimore, the State of Maryland, and the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service. Even a bizarre at-
tempt by Maryland's House of Delegates, which sat as
a 'super grand jury', heard testimony and issued public
recommendations, failed to break the impasse between
the transit company and the union. Negotiations over
economic differences were clouded and confused by
charges and countercharges of refusal to bargain, by
the delicate question of a rise in transit fares should a
* Of the 'Baltimore City Bar; B.S., 1929, New York University; Jur.
Doctor 1933, New York University School of Law.
'Md. Laws 1956, Ch. 41.
2 Lehrer, The Maryland Public Utilities Disputes Act, 7 Labor L. J. 607
(1956).
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wage increase be granted, and by lengthy debate on the
evils of absentee ownership of the company, and pos-
sible municipal ownership. As the strike became pro-
longed, public confusion and protest mounted, and with
the apparent ineffectiveness of conventional settlement
devices, there seemed little recourse but for the state
to forcibly intervene and revive service on Baltimore's
public transportation system.
"The strike began at midnight, Sunday, January 29,
1956, over issues which are normally bargained in labor
negotiations: wages, which the union asked be raised
from $1.90 to $2.15 hourly; hours (a 40-hour week and
an eight-hour day); and a variety of fringe items and
other changes in working conditions peculiar to the
transit industry. Participation of Baltimore Mayor
Thomas D'Alesandro, Jr., in negotiations had not in-
duced a retreat from the positions taken by both parties
when bargaining began. The union adhered to its eco-
nomic demands, and the company .. .refused to con-
sider any wage increase until the union 'dropped its
demands for large sums of money and special fringe
benefits - including make-work rules' (1). The union,
just prior to work stoppage, had approved a 30-day
moratorium on strike action contingent on binding arbi-
tration of all issues in dispute at the end of that period.
The company's reply was that 'arbitration [was] not a
subject for collective bargaining', and local union Presi-
dent Frank P. Baummer, charged the transit company
with refusing to make an offer (2)."1
Against a backdrop of mounting public indignation and
the frustration felt by public officials, all of whose efforts
to settle the strike had shattered themselves on the twin
obstacles of union resistance and company obduracy,
Governor McKeldin threatened the disputants with legis-
lative action in the form of a seizure bill. The members of
the Maryland general assembly had an understandable
reluctance to become identified with legislation of a com-
pulsory nature directed against a labor union. They came
up with a device, less drastic but equally dramatic, which
'Ibid, 607-8. The statements Indicated by the footnotes (1, 2) within the
quoted text are from the Baltimore Sun, January 29, 1956.
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it was hoped would still the public clamor and hopefully,
because of the floodlight of publicity attendant upon its use,
might force the parties into a settlement. Baltimore dele-
gates to the general assembly thereupon voted to force a
"grand inquest" into the dispute. The inquest, having lain
dormant on Maryland's statute books for many years, had
never been used before. It vests in the state general assem-
bly broad powers to demand records and summon wit-
nesses. It was hoped that in the context of the paralysis in
public transportation caused by the crippling strike of the
transit workers in the City of Baltimore the use of the in-
quest would illuminate the causes of the strike and perhaps
facilitate legislation to restore transit service and prevent
future disputes.
The general assembly voted in favor of the grand inquest
on February 3, 1956; the inquest ended on February 23 after
ten days of hearings replete with charges and counter-
charges hurled by both sides against each other. The public
was regaled with reams of newspaper headlines that did
succeed in ventilating the differences between the parties.
The legislative halls were used by both disputants to gen-
erate more heat than light and as a consequence the stage
was set for the passage of remedial legislation.
The legislators appeared to be torn between demands for
action and pleas from both the union and the company for
caution. At this juncture, while the delegates began prepa-
ration of their recommendations, the Baltimore Transit
Company presented its "final offer": a three year contract
and an 180 wage raise over the three year period. The com-
pany also revealed its intention to seek approval of a fare
raise from 18 to 20 cents from the Public Service Commis-
sion. The union executive board urged its membership to
reject this offer and the members complied with a 100 per
cent standing vote against the proposal.
Finally, on Wednesday, February 29, the house passed
a seizure law and the senate followed suit on March 1.
Governor McKeldin signed the bill into law and authorized
the state attorney general to prepare legal orders and docu-
ments necessary for state seizure and operation. The gover-
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nor planned to wait until Monday, March 5, and if there
was still no settlement, seizure would take place at his
mandate.
Last minute efforts at settlement failed and seizure
power was invoked on March 5. It was hoped that service
would be resumed by Friday, March 9. The union president
promised to urge his members to return to work under pro-
test and the union denounced the act as "invalid, unconsti-
tutional, unfair... and unsound as legislation".'
The Maryland Public Utilities Disputes Act provides,
inter alia, that after state seizure there immediately follows
a 15 day period of mediation which may be extended for an
additional 60 day period if the parties so elect. If mediation
fails, the dispute is then referred to a three man board of
arbitration which is empowered to render a final and bind-
ing decision.'
The transit employees returned to work, the company
was granted a temporary fare increase by the Public Ser-
vice Commission, for the "purpose of protecting the legality
of State transit operation with a fare structure that would
produce a reasonable return to the company for (the) use
of its facilities".6
Now that seizure was in effect, the mechanics of com-
pulsory settlement became operative and mediation talks
began. After many unsuccessful conferences the mediation
period expired and left both parties awaiting state action.
The parties elected not to try another 45 days of mediation
and the governor invoked compulsory arbitration and re-
quested the parties to name one member each to a three
man panel, with the third member to be selected by the
labor and management members. The union said it was
ready to name an arbitrator but the company promptly de-
clined. At this point the company commenced action in the
federal court designed to test the constitutionality of the
law claiming that the Seizure Bill violated due process.
Hearings before a three judge bench of the United States
district court were planned for May 1, 1956.
'Baltimore Sun, March 6, 1956.
8 Supra, n. 1, Sec. 1, 12F(2).
$Baltimore Sun, March 9, 1956.
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In the meantime the state tried to follow the procedures
set forth in the Seizure Bill. The law contained no provision
designed to cope with the situation created by the com-
pany's refusal to name its arbitrator. Accordingly an
amendment was introduced empowering the governor to
name arbiters to the arbitration board if either party to a
dispute refused to comply. This amendment was passed on
April 4 and the parties were given one week in which to
appoint their arbitrators. Three days later Chief Judge
Roszel C. Thomsen heard arguments for and against a tem-
porary restraining order asked for by the company to pre-
vent Governor McKeldin from appointing its arbitrator.
Before the decision on this issue was rendered, the state and
the transit company began to prepare for the hearings on
the act's validity. Ironically, for the first time since the dif-
ferences between the company and the union developed,
the union found itself in agreement with the company and
joined in the law action to contend that the state had no
jurisdiction in the case. The state took the position that
the constitution had not been violated, since a state has
authority to act in such manner as to protect the health
and welfare of its citizens; the state also maintained that
since the transit workers, by the terms of the Seizure Bill,
would technically become employees of the state, binding
arbitration was legal.
The District Court issued a restraining order on April
10, preventing the holding of arbitration hearings until the
constitutional test on May 1. The court sustained the com-
pany contention that it would suffer irreparable damage if
compulsory arbitration were carried out on two grounds:
(1) If the seizure law were to be invalidated, expenditures
incident to arbitration would prove futile for all concerned;
(2) If the law were to be declared invalid, free collective
bargaining would be hampered because "any findings of
the arbitration board would affect bargaining later on by
indicating a basis for settlement".7 On April 11, 1956, the
union executive board announced its approval of a settle-
ment proposal made by the company which provided the
Baltimore Sun, April 11, 1956.
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following terms: a 32 month contract; a 20 hourly increase
to be spread over the length of the contract (a 10€ hourly
increase, effective immediately, and the remainder to be
added in two steps of 5¢ each during the life of the agree-
ment); liberalized vacation benefits and other adjustments.
There was one condition tied to this package by the com-
pany: the fare increase would have to remain at 20, rather
than revert back to 18 at the termination of seizure. There-
fore action by the Public Service Commission would have to
be obtained.
This proposal was accepted by the union, the governor
was notified of the settlement and seizure was terminated
by proclamation on April 26. The 20f fare was continued
and after the return of the Baltimore transit facilities to
private ownership, the law suit was dismissed by the federal
court with the court's approval and without prejudice.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SEIZURE BILL
Even though the immediate reason for the passage of the
Seizure Bill, the transit strike in Baltimore City, has long
since receded from the public mind and has become as stale
as yesterday's newspaper it would appear desirable to
analyze the constitutionality of the law because the Act is
due to come up for consideration in the January 1957 session
of the legislature. This is so because as the law was origi-
nally enacted by the legislature it contained this provision:
"And be it further enacted, That this Act shall con-
tinue in effect only until 15 days after the adjournment
of the regular session of the General Assembly of Mary-
land held in the year 1957. ''1
In view of the above, making it obligatory on the Maryland
legislature to consider whether to allow the Seizure Bill to
expire by inaction or to continue it in effect on the statute
books, it appears appropriate to determine at this time
whether the law, as it now stands, would be likely to sur-
vive a court test if such should be directed against it.
8 Supra, n. 1, Sec. 5.
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The constitutional questions revolve around the funda-
mental doctrines of due process and federal jurisdictional
pre-emption, on the one hand, and the right of a state to
step in and protect the health and welfare of its citizens,
on the other. Discussion could range far and wide over the
many faceted legal problems that this controversial piece of
legislation invites. Since it would appear that, altogether
apart from other aspects of the law, the Seizure Bill is
fatally vulnerable in the area of the federal doctrine of pre-
emption it will be the major purpose of this article to keep
the focus sharply on this feature of the law.
The Maryland Public Utilities Disputes Act appears to
intrude upon a field fully occupied by Congress. In 1951 the
United States Supreme Court, in Amalgamated Association
of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of
America, Division 998, et al. v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board,9 set aside as unconstitutional, a statute of
the state of Wisconsin which prohibited strikes in certain
public utilities. That statute was declared invalid in a case
involving the Milwaukee local transit system and the local
gas utility. The transit line had no vehicles or equipment
that operated outside of the state of Wisconsin and all the
properties of the gas company were physically located with-
in the state of Wisconsin. The court held that Congress had
pre-empted the field insofar as regulation of such strikes
concerned industries which affect interstate commerce and
under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the
United States, Congress had closed it to state regulation.
The above enunciation of this basic federal doctrine is em-
bedded in the law of the land and has been many times ex-
plicitly adjudicated by the United States Supreme Court.'0
It appears that, in the field of labor relations, the appli-
cation of the federal pre-emption concept has served to
'340 U. S. 383 (1951).
10 Bethlehem Co. v. State Board, 330 U. S. 767 (1947) ; LaCrosse Tel. Corp.
v. Wis. Board, 336 U. S. 18 (1949) ; Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, 338 U. S. 953 (1950) [per curiam]; Automo-
bile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U. S. 454 (1950) ; Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538
(1945); Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468 (1955); Pocatello
Bldg. & Construction Trades Council et al. v. Elie Co., Per Curiam, Case
No. 372, November 5, 1956, 39 Labor Relations Reference Manual (herein-
after cited LRRM) 2055.
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narrow state jurisdiction practically to the vanishing point.
In one of the fountainhead cases on this point, Amalgamated
Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin ERB, the Supreme
Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, held as
follows:
"We have recently examined the extent to which
Congress has regulated peaceful strikes for higher
wages in industries affecting commerce. Automobile
Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U. S. 454 (1950). We noted
that Congress, in Section 7 of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act of 1935, as amended by the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947, expressly safe-guarded for
employees in such industries the 'right... to engage
in... concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection'. 'E.g., to
strike.' We also listed the qualifications and regula-
tions which Congress itself has imposed upon its guar-
antee of the right to strike, including requirements
that notice be given prior to any strike upon termina-
tion of a contract, prohibitions on strikes for certain
objectives declared unlawful by Congress, and special
procedures for certain strikes which might create
national emergency. Upon review of these federal
legislative provisions we held,...:
'None of these sections can be read as per-
mitting concurrent state regulation of peaceful
strikes for higher wages. Congress occupied this
field and closed it to state regulation. .. .'I'
As further amplification of the thesis of the instant
article that Congress intended to occupy the field of labor
relations in public utilities enterprises the following
quotation from the Labor Law Journal seems distinctly
apposite: 12
"The intent of Congress to occupy labor relations in
public utilities (as 'affecting commerce') was expressed
in a 1950 decision of the NLRB, in the matter of W. C.
King Company."8 Here the Board asserted jurisdic-
tion over a transit line employing 22 workers, and oper-
1 t Supra, n. 9, 389. Emphasis added.
Lehrer, The Maryland Public Utilitie8 Di8pute8 Act, 7 Labor L. 3. 607,
616-617 (1956).
"91 N. L. R. B. 630 (1950).
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ating 15 busses, within the State of Tennessee. In one
year, the company bought three buses and a quantity
of tires (total $37,500), imported from outside the state.
The transit line carried an average of 1,061 passengers
daily. The NLRB concluded that the company was en-
gaged in interstate commerce, and that:
... public utilities, including public transit
systems.., have such an important impact on com-
merce as to warrant our jurisdiction over all cases
involving such enterprises, where they are engaged
in commerce or in operations affecting commerce,
subject only to the rule of de minimis."
"The decision was to assert jurisdiction here, and in
all other cases involving public utilities and transit
systems, except in trifling instances.
"In the Wisconsin case,14 state legislation requiring
compulsory arbitration of disputes in public utilities
was struck down, over the argument that the law was
a valid exercise of police power, held to be essential
to the public health and safety. The Supreme Court
ruled that the right to strike for legitimate objectives
by traditional means was being restricted in industries
where this right was protected by federal law. The
Court pointed out that Congress, in enacting the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947, had gone so far as
to restrict the right to strike only in cases of national
emergencies, and that the Wisconsin legislation was in
conflict with federal law. The Court also did the
following:
(1) reiterated federal jurisdiction over privately
owned public utilities doing business within a
single state, but 'affecting commerce';
(2) held that no distinction existed between public
utilities and national manufacturing organiza-
tions in the administration of federal law; in
fact, separate treatment had been suggested and
rejected by Congress in 1947;
(3) described the Wisconsin act as 'not emergency
legislation but a comprehensive code for settle-
ment of labor disputes between public utility
'Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Board, supra, n. 9.
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employers and employees... and that the in-
voking of the Act does not necessitate the exist-
ence of an emergency.'
"In making the last point, the Court did not deter-
mine whether or not true emergency legislation would
be upheld on the state level. It should be noted that the
Wisconsin act had been applied indiscriminately to
national and local strikes alike, many of which could
not be properly classified as 'emergencies'.
"This decision, then, bars a formalized system pro-
hibiting strikes in public utilities which could be easily
invoked to deal with many kinds of labor disputes. In
short, the inclusiveness of the Wisconsin law and its
comprehensiveness led to its judicial downfall.
"The thesis here is that these defects were absent
from the Maryland Public Utilities Disputes Act, when
originally enacted. The restricted coverage and 'gen-
uine emergency' character of the Maryland law have
been discussed above; the law is clearly applicable to
localized emergencies in specific industries; no over-all
code for dispute settlement is constituted, but instead
the use of cumbersome and formalistic emergency
proclamation procedure is required."
Different from the position expressed by Mr. Seymour
H. Lehrer, the author of the above quoted statement, the
writer of the instant article is of the opinion that the Mary-
land Seizure Bill, as written, is in headlong conflict with
the Supreme Court's decision in the Wisconsin ERB case.
Thus the Maryland statute, no less than the Wisconsin law,
is an intrusion into a field pre-empted by federal law and
therefore would appear to be invalid.
It has been argued that despite the Wisconsin ERB and
companion cases the Supreme Court has not completely
closed the door to state regulation of industries operating
in interstate commerce or operating in industries affecting
commerce. The area still left ajar for state regulation con-
cerns situations where the states are said to have the in-
violate right to exercise regulatory authority, where by so
doing the states are exercising their inherent police power.
A state may always take action if such action is held to be
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essential to safeguard the health and safety of its citizens.
Some of the cases usually cited in support of this proposi-
tion are the following:
Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Board;"
Auto Workers v. Wisconsin ERB;16
Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin
ERB; 17
United Construction Workers v. Laburnam.8
It has been urged that, based on the reasoning contained
in the above enumerated cases, the State is not precluded
from enacting laws in the field of labor relations merely
because Congress has entered this field. The right to en-
gage in concerted activities, while guaranteed to employees
by Congress in the Labor-Management Relations Act, 9 is
not an unqualified right. Similarly the right to picket,
which is protected by the free speech and assemblage pro-
visions of the Constitution, is also not unqualified. When
either or both of these privileges collide with other feder-
ally guaranteed liberties then it becomes necessary to strike
a balance between these conflicting immunities in order to
best serve the utilitarian needs of our citizens. Put in an-
other way it can be said that:
"The states may, under [their] police power, regu-
late the means employed in a strike (that is, cases of
violence, mass picketing...). The objectives of a strike
in an industry under federal jurisdiction are subject
to NLRB regulation and the federal courts alone, unless
the NLRB chooses to delegate authority to the states.
The net effect is that no state may prohibit or hinder
a legitimate strike over wages, hours or working con-
ditions."2
Thus, the Allen-Bradley case dealt with the validity of an
order issued by the Wisconsin labor board restricting mass
picketing and threatened violence. The Court reviewed the
- 315 U. S. 740 (1942).
10336 U. S. 245 (1949).
17336 U. S. 301 (1949).
8347 U. S. 656 (1954).
Labor-Management Relations Act, Sec. 7, 29 U. S. C. A. (1956), Sec. 157.
' Note, supra, n. 12, 616.
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legislative history of federal legislation and with respect to
mass picketing and violence concluded that:
"The Committee Reports on the federal Act plainly
indicate that it is not a 'mere police court measure' and
that authority of the several States may be exerted to
control such conduct. '21
However, the Court was careful to note that:
"If the order of the state Board affected the status
of the employees, or if it caused a forfeiture of collec-
tive bargaining rights, a distinctly different question
would arise."2
Likewise, the Auto Workers case dealt with an area which
the Court found had not been touched by the Federal Act,
i.e., intermittent work stoppages. The Court found the state
order prohibiting this conduct to be valid because that kind
of practice "was neither forbidden by federal statute nor
was it legalized and approved thereby".
The Algoma Plywood2' matter dealt with a restriction
employed by the state on the execution of a union security
agreement. This restriction was found to be valid because
the Taft-Hartley Act (in Section 14(b) thereof)25 specifically
permits the states to adopt legislation on that subject more
restrictive than that provided for in the federal law.
Each of the above cases was cited to and considered by
the United States Supreme Court when it ruled invalid the
utilities statute that forbade strikes in public utilities affect-
ing commerce.
The Laburnum"6 case dealt with tortious acts performed
by a labor organization in the conduct of picketing and re-
lated activities in connection with a labor dispute, where
certain unfair labor practices by the union were also in-
volved, and where all the Court did was sustain the right of
the state courts to award monetary damages for such tor-
tious acts and conduct.
"Supra, n. 15, 748.
lbid, 751. (Emphasis supplied.)
Supra, n. 16, 264.5.
,Supra, n. 17, 315.
29 U. S. C. A. (1956), Sec. 164(b).
Supra, n. 18.
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In a very recent case decided by the Supreme Court on
June 4, 1956, United Automobile, A. & A. I. W. v. Wisconsin
Emp. Rel. Bd.,27 the Court was presented with a variation
of the problems discussed above. The Court's scrutiny was
directed to a situation concerning a cease and desist order
issued by the Wisconsin labor board prohibiting the union
from engaging in mass picketing and intimidation of non-
striking employees of an interstate employer on the ground
that such union action was violative of the Wisconsin Em-
ployment Peace Act. The question presented was novel in
that the union contended the state had no right to entrust
power to prevent such conduct to a labor board especially
when, as here, the National Labor Relations Board had
asserted jurisdiction over certain other labor practices aris-
ing from the same employer-union relationship. This con-
tention was brushed aside by Mr. Justice Reed who del-
livered the opinion of the Court in the course of a full dis-
cussion of the applicable provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act and prior adjudications of the Court concern-
ing this subject:
"Appellant [union] concedes that a State may
punish violence arising in labor relations controversies
under its generally applicable criminal statutes. It does
not admit or deny the charged violence. The union con-
siders the coercion immaterial in this case. Its position
is that a State may not exercise this police power with
an agency that is concerned only with labor relations.
The argument is that a State Board will use this power
to stop force and violence in order to further state
labor policy, thus creating a conflict with the federal
policy as developed by the National Labor Relations
Board. The union argues that Wisconsin has no juris-
diction to enjoin the alleged conduct under its labor act
because such conduct would be an unfair labor practice
under the National Labor Relations Act.
"The Kohler Company is subject to the National
Labor Relations Act. It seems agreed, and we think
correctly in view of the findings of fact, that the alleged
conduct of the union in coercing employees in the exer-
t76 S. Ct. 794 (1956), noted, 16 Md. L. Rev. 344 (1956).
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cise of their rights is a violation of § 8(b) (1) of that Act.
Since there is power under the Act to protect em-
ployees against violence from labor organizations by
assuring their right to refrain from concerted labor ac-
tivities, the National Labor Board might have issued an
order similar to that of the State Board. The provisions
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, cover
the labor relations of the Kohler Company .... These
provisions may be assumed to include not only the
coercion of strikers but also other persons seeking em-
ployment with the plant.
"By virtue of the Commerce Clause, art. 1, §8, cl. 3,
Congress has power to regulate all labor controversies
in or affecting interstate commerce, such as are here
involved. If the congressional enactment occupies the
field, its control by the Supremacy Clause, art. 6, cl. 2,
supersedes or, in the current phrase, pre-empts state
power.... In the 1935 Act, §10(a), the Board was em-
powered to prevent unfair labor practices. By §10(a)
this power was made 'exclusive'. In the Taft-Hartley
amendments of 1947, the word 'exclusive' was omitted
but the phrase, 'shall not be affected by any other
means of adjustment or prevention that has been or
may be established by agreement, code, law, or other-
wise', was reenacted without significant change.
"... Appellant urges that this amendment elimi-
nated the State's power to control the activities now
under consideration, through state labor statutes.
"It seems obvious that §8(b) (1) was not to be the
exclusive method of controlling violence even against
employees, much less violence interfering with others
approaching an area where a strike was in progress.
No one suggests that such violence is beyond state
criminal power. The Act does not have such regulatory
pervasiveness. The state interest in law and order pre-
cludes such interpretation. Senator Taft explained that
the federal prohibition against union violence would
allow state action.
"There is no reason to re-examine the opinions in
which this Court has dealt with problems involving
federal-state jurisdiction over industrial controversies.
They have been adequately summarized in Weber v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468.... As a general
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matter we have held that a State may not, in the fur-
therance of its public policy, enjoin conduct 'which has
been made an "unfair labor practice" under the fed-
eral statutes' .... But our post Taft-Hartley opinions
have made it clear that this general rule does not take
from the States power to prevent mass picketing, vio-
lence, and overt threats of violence.... Nor should the
fact that a union commits a federal unfair labor prac-
tice while engaging in violent conduct prevent States
from taking steps to stop the violence.
"We hold that Wisconsin may enjoin the violent
union contract here involved. The fact that Wisconsin
has chosen to entrust its power to a labor board is of
no concern to this Court."2 8
It is interesting to note that there was a vigorous dissent-
ing opinion in the above case, written by Mr. Justice
Douglas, with whom the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Black
concurred which held as follows:
"Here the State has prescribed an administrative
remedy that duplicates the administrative remedy pre-
scribed by Congress. Each reaches the same identical
conduct. We disallowed that duplication of remedy in
Garner v. Teamsters, etc. Union, 346 U. S. 485.... In
that case we held that a state court could not enjoin
action which was subject to an unfair labor proceeding
under the federal Act.... Today we depart from Garner
and allow a state board to enjoin action which is sub-ject to an unfair labor proceeding before the federal
board. We sanction a precise duplication of remedies
which is pregnant with potentialities of clashes and
conflicts. '29
It is interesting to note at this juncture that the Mary-
land Court of Appeals has explicitly acknowledged and ac-
cepted the federal doctrine of pre-emption in the case of
Sterling v. Local 438, Etc."
It would seem clear from the above that the Maryland
Public Utilities Disputes Act cannot be said to avoid the
Ibid, 796-800.
Ibid, dis. op. 800.
207 Md. 132, 144-148, 113 A. 2d 389 (1955).
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proscriptions set forth in the Supreme Court's decisions re-
ferred to. The Baltimore Transit Company has been held
to be engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning
of the National Labor Relations Act." The strike in Balti-
more and the picketing which accompanied it were orderly
and peaceful. If there was a refusal to bargain in good faith
committed by either the transit company or the union such
action constituted an unfair labor practice for which an
adequate remedy is provided by the federal statute. Anal-
agous cases concerning public utility companies have con-
sistently held that the congressional enactment of the Labor
Management Relations Act occupies the field and thereby
pre-empts state power in this area. It cannot be seriously
argued that when the State of Maryland enacted its Public
Utilities Disputes Act the said Act did not attempt to regu-
late labor relations. Indeed the causa sui for the passage
of this statute came about solely and only because the City
of Baltimore was paralyzed by a labor dispute. In fact the
total scheme and purpose of the Seizure Bill concerns itself
with a legislative intent to prevent strikes in public utilities.
It would therefore seem clear that the Maryland Public
Utilities Disputes Act is a statute intended to regulate labor
relations within the meaning of the Garner2 and Anheuser-
Busch s cases and that it is invalid and unconstitutional.
SumEs= REMEDIES
If it is true, as seems to be indicated by the present
posture of the law concerning the operation of the federal
doctrine of pre-emption, that the States are virtually im-
potent in this area to pass remediable legislation, what re-
course is available to correct this situation? The most obvi-
ous suggestion is that the Congress take the necessary steps
to dispel the cloud of confusion and frustration that seems
to envelop this subject. Efforts have been made in this
direction as witness the following:
" National Labor Relations Board v. Baltimore T. Co., 140 F. 2d 51 (4th
Cir., 1944), cert. den., 321 U. S. 795 (1944).
Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485 (1953).
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468 (1955).
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"Federal Preemption. The Senate Judiciary com-
mittee has voted to report a bill (S. 3142) sponsored by
12 Southern Senators that would deny preemption to
federal laws unless they carry an express provision of
supremacy or are in positive conflict with state law in
the same field. The Senate bill is identical to H.R. 3 in-
troduced by Congressman Smith (D., Va.) which was
sidetracked by the House Judiciary Committee. The
text of the bill follows:
" 'That no Act of Congress shall be construed
as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to
occupy the field in which such Act operates to the
exclusion of any state laws on the same subject
matter, unless such Act contains an express pro-
vision to that effect. No Act of Congress shall be
construed as invalidating a provision of state law
which would be valid in the absence of such Act
unless there is a direct and positive conflict be-
tween an express provision of such Act and such
provision of the state law so that the two cannot be
reconciled or consistently stand together'. 34
While it is true that the above bills died in Committee in
the 84th Congress they may be reintroduced in the 85th
session of the Congress.
CONCLUSION
The Seizure Bill, while it solved nothing, nevertheless
served a useful purpose. Passed at a time when the parties
were deadlocked in what appeared to be a hopeless impasse,
it did create leverage to break the log jam and it did catalyze
the seemingly irreconcilable positions of the parties thus
investing the bargaining climate with pressure which ulti-
mately led to a settlement.
On the purely legal level the foregoing analysis of the
adjudicated cases leads to the following conclusions: the
operation of the federal doctrine of pre-emption in indus-
tries engaged in interstate commerce means that the federal
government has occupied the field and thus closed it to state
regulation. Unless and until the Congress passes legislation
", Labor Relations Reporter, News & Background, 38 LRR 140, June 18,
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freeing the States from the operation of the pre-emption
doctrine, attempted state regulation in this area is likely
to be held to be invalid by the federal courts.
The Labor Relations Reporter succinctly summarizes the
NLRB's authority to secure federal injunctive relief against
state intrusion upon its jurisdiction:
"If a state court or board should invade the NLRB's
exclusive jurisdiction, the NLRB may turn to a federal
district court for injunctive relief to protect its jurisdic-
tion. Ordinarily the applicable federal statute (28 U. S.
Code 2283) severely limits the right of a U. S. court to
enjoin state court proceedings, authorizing them only
'where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction . . ..' But
the Supreme Court held in 1954 that the NLRB's exclu-
sive jurisdiction might be protected by such an injunc-
tion (Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB . . . 347 U. S.
501 .. .). Other decisions have granted injunctions
against state boards charged with invading NLRB's
exclusive jurisdiction, but have made clear that only
the NLRB may obtain such an injunction, there being
no authority to issue one on the petition of an employer
or a union. ' ' 5
This leaves the question as to areas where the States may
act. In general:
".... jurisdiction over various aspects of labor rela-
tions and employment regulation is divided between
the state and federal governments as follows:
"(1) Jurisdiction over strictly intrastate matters
rests exclusively with the states, since such matters are
beyond the reach of the Federal Government's consti-
tutional power. Where interstate commerce is in-
volved, the federal jurisdiction is exclusive unless the
matter comes within one of the exceptions to the fed-
eral preemption.
"(2) The LMRA expressly authorizes concurrent
state regulation of union security agreements. The fed-
eral law bars the closed shop but permits the union
shop. Section 14 (b), however, provides that the federal
law shall yield to a stricter state law on the subject....
"(3) An exception expressly noted in the Garner
decision permits the states to act in cases of 'mass
a State Laws, Labor Relations Reporter, SLL 1:4, 1:5.
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picketing, threatening of employees, obstructing streets
and highways, or picketing homes', even though the
LMRA also regulates the same activities. The Supreme
Court approvingly quoted its 1942 holding that a state
still may exercise 'its historic powers over such tra-
ditionally local matters as public safey and order and
the use of the streets and highways (Allen-Bradley,
315 U. S. 740 .... ) .'
"(4) The Garner case also recognized state juris-
diction over certain other forms of 'coercive' employee
conduct, regardless of whether interstate commerce is
affected. These include 'sitdown' strikes and recurrent
and unannounced 'quickie' strikes ....
"(5) The Laburnum decision.., upheld the right of
state courts to take jurisdiction of common law actions
to recover damages for a union's tortious conduct, even
though the case involves conduct and an employer with-
in the NLRB's jurisdiction. .... 36
"(6) In the regulation of wages, hours, and child
labor, there is concurrent jurisdiction. If the state
standard is higher or stricter, it applies. If not, it gives
way to the federal standard where the interstate com-
merce or the production of goods for interstate com-
merce is involved.
"(7) Certain fields still are wide open for state regu-
lation, since no federal laws regulating them have been
adopted. The states,... have a free hand regarding the
regulation of racial and religious discrimination in em-
ployment, wage payment, payroll stuffers, and so forth
regardless of the effect on interstate commerce. The
regulation, of course, may not violate any other con-
stitutional provision.""7
The last question on this subject relates to the status of
cases where the NLRB declines to assert jurisdiction even
though interstate commerce is affected. This is still an open
question and unfortunately, with respect to this so called
"twilight zone" there would not appear to be any answers
to be found in the adjudicated cases. The Supreme Court
itself indicated, shortly after the Garner case, that it has
Ibid, SLL 1:4 and 5.
"Ibid, SLL 1:5, 1:6.
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not passed on this question. 8 The General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board has said that he does not
believe that the Board will ever seek to block state action
in situations where the NLRB chooses to desist from exer-
cising jurisdiction because it believes the impact of the
activity of the employer on commerce is insubstantial. 9
It might be interesting to note that by the passage of
the Public Utilities Disputes Act, Maryland became the
14th state to enact legislation designed to regulate labor
disputes in the field of public utilities.0
Bldg. Trades Council v. Kinard, 346 U. S. 933 (1954). Per curiam.
34 LRRM 78, 80.
'0 See tables In Appendix, taken from LRRM pp. 3058, 3059.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 6. REGULATION OF DISPUTES IN PUBLIC UTILITIES,
GOVERNMENT SERVICE, AND ESSENTIAL INDUSTRIES
,--Provision Against Strikes in------,
State and Public Govern- Other Provisions
Date of Law Utilities ment Essential For
Service Industries Seizure
Florida 1947 ...........  x1  ............... ---
Hawaii 1949 .... .. x ....
1949 Docks.................. .  x
Indiana 1947 ....... x ... ...............
Kansas 1920 ------------ x Industries af-
fected with the
public interest 2  x
2
Massachusetts 1947.-- xs D is t r i b u t io n o f
food, fuel, hos-
pital and medi-
cal services 3  x
Michigan 1949 x __ Hospitals'......
Minnesota 1947 .. .. Charitable
1951-.- x Hospitals.
Missouri 1947, 1949 x3, , x ................................. x
Nebraska 1947 x X ...........
New Jersey 1946,
1947, 1949, 1950 x8, 4  ....  .................................. x
New York 1947 ....... ... .. x ....................................
N orth D akota 1943 ...... ......... ..................................... xO hio 1947 ................ .......... x .... ....... ..  .......... .
Pennsylvania 1947. x1  .... . .................................... .
1947 ........... x. .. ..................
Texas 1947 ................... ...... x .......................
1947 ........... X 5...................... 
.V irginia 1946 .-..--.... ... x ...............
1950 ......... ....  . ... Coal Mines x
1952 x 9  . ............1952 ................ . x10 .. ............... .......  ...... 
W isconsin 1947 ........... x ...... ....................................... ......
'No strike until such time as all of the procedure provided for by law has been
exhausted.
2 The ban on strikes has not been exercised, since other features of the KansasIndustrial Relations Act were declared unconstitutional.
a No strike after the public utility has been taken over by the state.
' No strike for 60 days after written notice of intention to strike to the board of
mediation and the other party.No ban on strikes. Act provides penalties for picketing and sabotage.6 No strike for five weeks after mediation fails and the governor has been notified.7 Act unconstitutional, in opinion of State Attorney General (27 LRRM 69).5
Act held unconstitutional by U. S. Supreme Court (26 LRRM 2082) as applied to
an employer engaged in interstate commerce.No ban on strikes. Provides for mediation of public utility disputes.
10 No ban on strikes. Provides for temporary replacement of all employees who do not
want to work for the Government during seizure.
1956] MD. PUBLIC UTILITIES DISPUTES ACT 325
TABLE 7. COMPULSORY MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION
r-- Provision for------




















Any dispute, on peti-













1 The U. S. Supreme Court in decisions in 1923 and 1925 declared that It is uncon-
stitutional to fix wages by compulsory arbitration in the meat packing industry.
However, the act may still apply to the railroad and public utility industries.
2If no agreement is reached, a public hearing panel is established which must make
recommendations for settling the dispute.
' Act unconstitutional, in opinion of State Attorney General (27 LRRM 69).
